This article argues that the original thrust of the moral economy concept has been understated and attempts to cast it in a new light by bringing class and capital back into the equation. Finally, it argues that moral economy can enrich the concept of hegemony because it pays attention to the often-contradictory values that guide and sustain livelihood practices, through which cultural domination is reproduced or altered.
the term. It deals with the common conflation of moral economy with Polanyi's notion of embeddedness, differentiating the two concepts and scrutinizing the ways in which these perspectives have been criticized. Second, it dispels dichotomist conceptions separating economic practice from morality, or embedded configurations from disembedded ones. Against binary views of the market as a boundless realm penetrating previously untainted moral spheres, it posits that social reproduction is characterized by an entanglement of values, which can only be fully grasped by delineating the contours and characteristics of capital accumulation. Third, it contends that moral economy is a dynamic concept because it accounts for class-informed frameworks involving traditions, valuations and expectations.
Introduction 1
In the last two decades the moral economy concept has reemerged with strength. However, as often occurs with catchy categories, scholars have approached it in contradictory ways.
Among its di erent ff uses, two main strands stand out. On the one hand, moral economy has been used to scrutinize systems of provisioning that seem to emerge 'outside' or 'in the cracks of' the market. 'Solidarity', 'alternative' or 'informal' practices usually constitute the target. In these analyses, moral econ-omy is synonymous with an organized field of values, where economic practice appears 'embedded' in moral obligations and social norms (Olivier de Sardan, 1999; Tripp, 2006; Orlando, 2010; Langegger, 2015) . As Hann has noted in a recent reappraisal (2010), the central characteristic of this approach is that by highlighting values and norms, it challenges economistic views.
On the other hand, the growing interest in systems of values and norms per se has increasingly led scholars to drop the production and distribution of resources from the picture. In his 2009 article 'Les économies morales revisitées', Fassin critically discussed some of these instances, saluting their conceptual departure from Thompson's original rumination (1971) and warning about the risk of culturalization and depoliticization. Fassin's own work is paradigmatic of this second trend, where semantic weight has shifted from the noun (economy) to the adjective (moral). As he admits, his interest lies less with moral economies than with the economy of morals, that is, 'the production, distribution, circulation and use of moral feelings, emotions and values, norms and obligations in the social space' (Fassin, 2009 (Fassin, : 1257 . In other words, the economy in capital letters has ceased to be the object of analysis, leaving the spotlight on the study of morals (Daston, 1995; Fassin, 2009) . As a result, moral economy has quickly become a strange guest in the bourgeoning field of 'moral anthropology' (Zigon, 2007; Fassin, 2012) .
Though both kinds of literature o er ff tremendously relevant insights, the problem is that the original thrust of the concept has been understated, to the point of obscuring social relations rather than explaining them. As advised by Thompson (1991) and recalled by Edelman (2005 Edelman ( , 2012 , if simply equated with 'values' and emptied of class content, moral economy loses its raison d'être: anything can be deemed a moral economy. In this article we want to reclaim the radical foundations of the term by bringing capital and class back into the equation. This 'return to the roots' will hopefully not be read as an empty programmatic slogan, but as a theoretical operation that casts light on moral economy both as a concept and an approach.
First, conceptually speaking, we build on some of the insights that Narotzky developed in a recent article (2015) . We contend that the structural inequalities generated by particular forms of capital accumulation -mediated by particular kinds of state regulation -are always metabolized through particular fields constituted by dynamic combinations of norms, meanings and practices. It is these fields that we call moral economies. They can reproduce or strengthen patterns of capital accumulation that regulate social structure, but they can also alter and even shortcircuit them. As will be gleaned from our analysis below, the original moral economists point at nothing other than a historical shift from a particular moral economy of capitalism to a new moral economy. Following this line of thought, our article runs counter to a sort of common sense that restricts the concept to a particular social actor probably deriving from the fact that Thompson himself originally talked about the moral economy 'of the English crowd'.
We instead argue that analytical mileage can be gained by using it in relation to broad social fields of thought and action, Finally, it argues that moral economy can enrich the notion of hegemony because it pays attention to the often-contradictory values that guide and sustain livelihood prac-tices, through which cultural domination is reproduced and altered.
The origins of moral economy and its discontents
The concept of moral economy was popularized by the seminal work of E.P. Thompson. In his 1971 essay 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd', the historian focuses on the food riots in 18th-century England, in an attempt to reveal the historical agency of 'the crowd' and to argue against 'spasmodic views of popular history' that naturalize and reduce people's actions to automatic quasibiological responses to hunger. The brilliance of his work consists not only in that it unpacks the complex motivations and choices behind this particular pattern of collective action, but also in that it takes them as a window onto a wider socio-economic process:
namely, the long transition from a system of provision framed by paternalist institutions to an emerging political economy regulated by so-called free market policies, which benefited particular sectors of the bourgeoisie. These changes were well under way from the mid1700s on, accompanying the gradual repeal of protective legislation.
Yet as Thompson describes, in times of dearth, a particular consensus emerged between, on the one hand, town laborers and crafts-men and, on the other hand, local magistrates and the gentry.
This was based on a widely shared mentalite´ about emergency market-regulation in favor of the unprivileged and the poor. When di erent ff groups (tinners, carpenters, weavers and col-liers) chose to attack a series of social targets (mills, farmers withholding corn and suspicious middlemen) they did it with the purpose of, first, punishing immoral profit-seekers (rather than stealing to satisfy their hunger) and second, fixing prices. However, much of the recent literature engaging with the notion of moral economy and actually dealing with economic practice has generally not followed along in the footsteps of its founders. First, there is a common tendency to constrain the notion of moral economy to particular groups, which blurs the conflictual fields of thought and action they are part of. Such a problem possibly comes from the fact that Thompson and Scott themselves spoke, misleadingly, of 'the moral economy of the crowd' and 'the moral economy of the peasant'. Yet, as Kofti suggests in this issue, moral economy can only be associated with an actor if it also designates, complementarily, the broad field in which such an agent is inscribed.
And even then, locating a particular subject for a moral economy involves challenges that are very hard to rise to, such as 'the identification of a social group with a common moral economy', or the analysis of 'people's individual ideas and practices and their relation to collective moral frameworks' (Kofti, this issue).
Second -and partly as a result of circumscribing the concept to actors and their micro-spheres -the expansion of capitalist markets and their extremely complex social underpinnings tend to stay outside of moral economists' research interests. Moral econom(ies) are more-often-than-not portrayed as particular realms outside (or in the cracks of) the market and the state, as reciprocity-systems of survival linked to particular groups, often unprivileged ones. Thus, the term becomes associated with the ways in which di erent ff actors 're-embed' their relations in more equal and altruistic modes of social reproduction, such as religious projects of restoration (Tripp, 2006) , alternative practices around fair-trade (Orlando, 2010; Psarikidou and Szerszynski, 2012) or unconventional ways of exercising rights to property (Langegger, 2015) . As one can infer, these dominant approaches treat moral economy as an approximate synonym of Polanyian embeddedness (Hann, 2010) : a heuristic tool to study the ways in which small-scale economies are more or less embedded in complex arrays of norms, values and institutions. Some authors have also deployed the term to reflect on alternative political projects that might foster higher degrees of solidarity and 'embedded sociality' (Sayer, 2000; Bolton and Laaser, 2013) .
In their e ort ff to challenge vulgar economism, moral economists have ended up avoiding the market and -more specifically -the pervasive logics of capital as much as embeddedness theorists (Krippner, 2001) . In this sense, a key feature of this particular approach to the moral economy concept is the portrayal of norms Fox-Genovese, 1973; Popkin, 1979; Booth, 1994; Götz, 2015) .
Interestingly, Karl Polanyi's texts have also been criticized for (1994: 662) . He argues that even if moral economists warned against idealizing 'pre-modern communities', they could not avoid doing so: they presented them as realms of solidarity and equality where individual profit-making and hierarchies were neutralized in the name of the common good. According to this view, they built this ideal model and then used it as a mirror to present modern societies as commodified and dominated by the self-regulating mechanisms of the market. Against it, he argues that any economy is su used ff with the norms of the community of which it is a part, and that economic relations and values of communities are generally in a relation of reflective equilibrium.
All economies are moral economies
Most contemporary appropriations of the moral economic approach have certainly tended to institute this binary thinking, reducing the sphere of the normative to economies that are generally peripheral or articulated with an inherently amoral market. In this sense, Booth 'it is all too easy, and a serious mistake, to romanticize these social arrangements that distinguish much of peasant society. They are not radically egalitarian. Rather, they imply only that living is attained often at the cost of a loss of status and autonomy ' (1976: 5) . In his account, therefore, social consensus was not based on disinterested intentions or social justice. Forms of inequality were not absent, but they were largely tolerated. In fact, they actively worked for this, advocating government policies that deprived the peasantry of the means and institutions for selfprovision (Perelman, 2000) . However, Polanyi clearly underlines that a disembedded market economy, completely self-regulated, is impossible: 'Our thesis is that the idea of a self-regulating market implied an absolute utopia ' (2000: 18) . increase productivity at the work-place (Block, 2001; Krippner, 2001; Hann and Hart, 2011) .
The legacy of the original moral economists, moreover, prompts us to avoid treating the market as a boundless amoral force that ultimately commodifies (and destroys) so-called 'moral economies'
(characterized by norms and non-instrumental values). It urges us to see that market processes cannot be set in opposition to extraeconomic cultural and social forces. By the same token, it is important to bear in mind that stressing the 'cultural' or 'moral' aspects of market transactions does not imply disregarding the underlying logics of market transactions them-selves -a tendency that has produced views of the market that are as 'disembedded' as those of orthodox economists (Krippner, 2001; Krippner et al., 2004) . Briefly put, economic phenomena under capitalism might display features (such as the laws of supply and demand) that make them partly autonomous, but they are at the same time always interdependent with systems of meanings, institutions, and structures of social relations (Zelizer, 1988: 619) .
Insights on the problem of 'value regimes' (Appadurai, 1988) have allowed anthropologists to scrutinize these interdependences. The literature on the complex nature of gifts and commodities shows that the rise of a standard measure of value -represented by market relations -cannot do away with the constant proliferation of other forms of value that are simply incommensurable. The question of why some objects cannot be counted and are considered inalienable while others change value as they move across di erent ff regimes underscores a broader debate about the fuzzy boundaries between morality and market exchange (Gregory, 1982; Munn, 1992; Weiner, 1992; Strathern, 1988; Graeber, 2001) . In a similar vein, Valerio
Simoni's study of Cuban immigrants in crisis-ridden Spain (this issue) seeks to understand what counts for economic and what counts for moral for his inform-ants. In order to do so, he brings into the discussion current debates in moral anthropology (Robbins, 2007; Zigon, 2007 Zigon, , 2014 as well as performativity approaches to economization (Callon, 2007; C¸ alis¸ kan and Callon, 2009 
Bringing capital accumulation back in
Acknowledging that all economies are moral economies is crucial to our under-standing of the market. But it is not enough. In order to grasp the di erent ff dimensions and qualities of embeddedness it is crucial to bring capital into the heart of the analysis. (Blim, 1990; Ghezzi, 2003; Narotzky, 2015) .
Here, the question is not to evaluate the ways in which abstract market principles and logics are articulated with non-market relations. The micro settings that constitute the standard space of observation for anthropologists are always permeated with ambiguous logics, where self-interest, competition, market commensurability and commodification overlap with dependency, norms and incom-mensurable values (Gregory, 1997; Guyer, 2004; Gudeman, 2008) . Value regimes are intertwined, quite indiscernibly.
In spite of a recurring temptation to frame them according to binary oppositions, empirical observation reveals that they can be better understood through the topology of the Moebius strip (Sabel, 1991) :
as apparently distinguishable realms that in fact co-exist on the same plateau, in continuity. It is this very entanglement that sustains certain patterns of capital accumulation (Narotzky and Besnier, 2014; Palomera, 2014; Narotzky, 2015) . As Susana 
Capital and class, reproduction and change
Looking at how values, practices and relations are linked to patterns of accumulation defies the notion of moral economies as stable frameworks where cultural/ moral values and norms are static. In light of this, it is rather surprising that the main criticism lodged against the original moral economists is their alleged inability to account for social change (Popkin, 1979; Booth, 1994; Wegren, 2005 ' (1994: 658) . In order to back these arguments, repertoires of individual decision-making are emphasized. Popkin for instance is known for having famously coined the ideal-type of the 'rational peasant ' (1980) in order to underline the 'investment logic' and the self-interested calculative choices of peasants. In his view, the decisions of the latter are motivated not solely by concerns about protection but also by incentives for personal gain and future betterment, thus fostering the unequal stratification of their communities.
Far from these arguments, we contend that moral economy was originally conceived as a dynamic concept, capable of accounting for class-informed frameworks of meanings and expectations. The moral economic approach deals with the complex fields of struggle in which livelihood projects are involved, always tied to a particular moment and social structure. The 'consensus' that Thompson refers to does not imply that moral economy is reduced to coercion or habit and customs. On the contrary, he sees the market and social reproduction as spaces where class relations are constantly renegotiated. Consensus or continuity are not about voluntary agreement or free will, but most often an outcome of social struggle, which has its winners and losers. As Orlove puts it, moral economy tries to 'incorporate culture into analyses of class and political action', showing that 'people struggle not only for wealth and for power, but also for dignity ' (1997: 260) . Beyond the absolute priority that Adam Smith gives to 'property rights' and 'profit rights', Thompson pays attention to the web of 'entitlements' and 'responsibilities' which constitute the social and political basis of the economy or the market. He underlines that 'conflict over entitlement to food in the market might be seen as a forum of class struggle, if most of historians were not too prissy nowadays to use the term ' (1991: 287) . 'Food prices were not merely one point of conflict between working and property-owning classes over the material control of an economy, but were linked to class-specific notions of social rights and responsibilities ' (1991: 259) . There is little basis therefore for arguing that the riots described by Thompson were nostalgic movements to restore 'traditional systems'. Rather, we agree with Edelman that they were future-oriented (2005), as they partook in the historical strife among hierarchically-positioned social groups to define entitlements and rights, forms of social responsibility and obligation, tolerable levels of exploitation and inequality, meanings of dignity and justice. For Thompson, the 'market economy' is nothing else than a metaphor (or mask) for capitalist process, worn by particular interests. The 'market' is 'a mystifying metaphor for the energies released and the new needs (and choices) opened up by capitalist forms of exchanges, with all conflicts and contradictions withdrawn from view ' (1991: 305) .
Therefore, moral economy is dynamic by definition, and reproduction or change depends on the particular interface among shifts in capital accumulation patterns, mentalities (or borrowing Bourdieu's term, dispositions) and relations between class fractions.
Thompson describes an old redistributive paternalist arrangement that did not simply depend on the altruism of the elites: it was 'a calculative stance in the culturally constructed alliance between patricians and the plebs against the middling orders, and it distracted attention from the landowners' prosperity to point to prominent Dissenters and Quakers among the profiteering food dealers ' (1991: 301) . The state, with its multi-layered agents, played a protagonist role as well in these struggles and alliances, as it did in the transition to capitalism, particularly after the civil wars and the spread of anti-Jacobinism. The new definition of 'common weal'
shifted the solidarities and allegiances of the rulers, from the commoners to capital owners. Moral duties regarding the redistribution of wealth were increasingly redesigned as charity and hitherto legitimate claims to price-fixing became attacks on property. All of this occurred at a time when the industrial revolution was unfolding, and laboring people's demands increasingly shifted from market regulation (exchange of goods and money) to the rise of wages (labor) and the end of Speenhamland (Thompson, 1991) .
Furthermore, Thompson's particular approach to class sets the moral economic approach apart from the embeddedness thesis.
Polanyi is very sensitive to the class conflict underlying the epochal change he describes in The Great Transformation. For him, the role of the state as a coercing force plays a central role (Lie, 1991; Block, 2003; Bolton and Laaser, 2013) . However, as Burawoy (2003) The English working class could not be regarded as a blank slate, defenseless against market forces. It was already embedded in community, which gave it the weapons to defend itself and advance active society in its own name' (Burawoy, 2003: 222) .
Moral economy and hegemony
Since the seminal works of Thompson and Scott, moral to political action against the dominant powers or ideology but also those that might underpin positive visions of private property, the institutions of the market or racism, and that might be invoked to legitimate actions too. As he succinctly puts it: 'if moral economy is primarily a nexus of beliefs, practices and emotions among the folk, rather than an analytic concept designed to register only those beliefs, practices and emotions which conduce to action which the observer considers to be progressive, then we must conclude that even the reactionary right is entitled to its moral economy' (Hann, 2010: 195 1991 [1963] ).
The debate around class also points to a terrain for the most part avoided, which has to do with the reproduction of power. There is a crossroads at which the concept of moral economy and that of hegemony inevitably meet, though recent scholarship on moral economy has not explored how. In recent years hegemony has become like the elephant in the room: while moral economists pay close atten-tion to some of the situated micro-mechanisms that reproduce (or alter) power structures at large, they generally avoid engaging with hegemony theories. This is a striking gap since both Thompson (1971) and Scott (1985 Scott ( , 1990 deal with the concept, mainly to disagree with the idea that hegemony entails uncontested acceptance by the poor of their domination.
In that sense, Dimitrios Gkintidis's refreshing look at the moral economy of European integration with regard to Greece and its articulation with the notion of hegemony is a very welcome exception.
His study shows how di erently ff positioned actors in the institutional structure of EU aid persistently frame the latter in terms of gifts and 
Conclusion
Engaging with moral economy is not meant to revive a theoretical debate simply for the sake of theory. This paper seeks to both underline anthropology's capacity for holistic analysis and radical critique, and to respond to the intellectual urgency of the current historical moment. Our aim is therefore twofold. First, in the face of a bourgeoning anthropology of morals, we want to bring political economy to the center of anthropological analysis. In our understanding, moral economy is not political economy's 'other': it is not its historical antecedent in evolutionary terms; nor is it simply another scale of analysis. Moral economy is precisely the anthropological way to study the political economy. It deals since its inception with the practices, meanings and institutions that regulate social formations in a world increasingly dominated by the principles of capital accumulation. It is not therefore a synonym of the -often positively charged 'solidarity economies' functioning outside the market, or in its interstices (informal economy). Neither can it be deployed to simply account for micro-economic practices, such as networks of reciprocity and obligation that often cushion exploitation and crisis e ects, ff without linking them to power relations at large.
Moral economy, above all, is about understanding the inner workings of capitalism and the qualities of social reproduction at particular historical times and spaces. It is an approach that advocates an anthropological understanding of class (Wolf, 1982; Kalb, 1998; Narotzky and Smith, 2006; Carrier and Kalb, 2015) , bringing under the same analytical frame-work di erent ff regimes of value and pointing to the complex ways they are entangled.
Second, we contend that this theoretical exercise is a timely anthropological task. Moral economy seems particularly suited to interpret moments of historical rupture, where tensions between analytical dimensions such as between the moral frameworks and the logics of accumulation are exacerbated. In this issue, we are putting together in essays and in dialogue fresh anthropological accounts of crisis-ridden Europe. All papers deploy the concept of moral economy in order to make sense of and explain current processes of structural dispossession, such as the flexibilization of labor, the institutional architecture of the European Union and migration or transitions between political-economic regimes. Albeit in quite di erent ff ways, the authors seek to understand the everydaygrounded logics of macro-economic (and political) processes by bringing together structural proper-ties and peoples' moral dispositions. After all, moral economy is all about tracing the multiscalar logics of power (Wolf, 1990) , and power always involves struggle. Only by reading these two realms together can we understand current social mobilizations and silences, hegemony and counter-hegemony, continuity and change, or the mere conditions of possibility for them.
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